Fuel on the Fire
Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq
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- £4.99
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- £4.99
Publisher Description
The departure of the last US troops from Iraq at the end of 2011 left a broken country and a host of unanswered questions. What was the war really about? Why and how did the occupation drag on, while most Iraqis, Britons and Americans desperately wanted it to end? And what of oil, which lies at the heart of Iraqi politics?
Now in the first full account of the nine-year war and occupation, Greg Muttitt's gripping and far-reaching investigation takes us behind the scenes to answer some of those questions, centred on the taboo subject of what has happened to Iraq's oil. In light of the Arab revolutions, the war in Libya and renewed threats against Iran, Fuel on the Fire provides a vital guide to the lessons from Iraq.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
In this provocative study, journalist and activist Muttitt, former co-director of the London advocacy group Platform and policy director for the antipoverty organization War on Want, weaves a narrative of "how the struggles for control of Iraq's oil shaped events during the occupation." Drawing on U.S. and U.K. government documents obtained under Freedom of Information statutes and interviews with government officials and "ordinary Iraqis," the author claims that U.S. efforts in Iraq were tailored to "help the oil companies" at the expense of Iraqis. To that end, he charges that U.S. policy sowed the seeds of sectarianism among Iraqis an "alien sectarian politics and discourse" that the "Iraqis quickly rejected." Muttitt goes to great length to show that U.S. officials tried to shape a new oil law that favored international companies, although most Iraqis wanted to keep control of the country's oil in the public sector. He also insinuates that Centcom Commander Adm. William Fallon resorted to strong-arm tactics to force Iraqi acquiescence. Whatever its merits and intentions, the American effort to secure an oil law failed. After repeated questioning of U.S. motives, Muttitt concludes that political psychology, not conspiracy, explains the U.S. approach: officials genuinely believed that what is good for America is good for Iraq.
